1.0 Purpose and Benefits

This standard outlines the general steps for responding to computer security incidents. In addition to providing a standardized process flow, it (1) identifies the New York State (NYS) incident response (IR) stakeholders and establishes their roles and responsibilities; (2) describes incident triggering sources, incident types, and incident severity levels; and (3) includes requirements for annual testing, post-incident lessons-learned activities, and collection of IR metrics for use in gauging IR effectiveness.

The goals of IR, as outlined in this standard, are to

- Confirm whether an incident occurred.
- Provide a defined incident notification process.
- Promote the accumulation and documentation of accurate information.
- Establish controls for proper retrieval and handling of evidence.
- Contain the incident and stop any unwanted activity quickly and efficiently.
- Minimize disruption to network operations.
- Provide accurate reports and useful recommendations to management.
- Prevent and/or mitigate future incidents from occurring.

2.0 Authority

*Section 103(10) of the State Technology Law* provides the Office of Information Technology Services (ITS) with the authority to establish statewide technology policies, including technology and security standards. *Section 2 of Executive Order No. 117*, established January 2002, provides the State Chief Information Officer with the authority to oversee, direct and coordinate the establishment of information technology policies,
protocols and standards for State government, including hardware, software, security and business re-engineering. Details regarding this authority can be found in NYS ITS Policy, NYS-P08-002 Authority to Establish Enterprise Information Technology (IT) Policies, Standards and Guidelines.

3.0 Scope

This standard applies to all “State Entities” (SE), defined as “State Government” entities as defined in Executive Order 117, established January 2002, or “State Agencies” as defined in Section 101 of the State Technology Law. This includes employees and all third parties (such as local governments, consultants, vendors, and contractors) that use or access any ITS resource for which ITS the SE has administrative responsibility, including systems managed or hosted by third parties on behalf of the ITS SE. While an SE may adopt a different standard, it must include the requirements in this one.

4.0 Information Statement

4.1 IR Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities

To respond effectively to a computer security incident, it is critical that all IR stakeholders fully understand not only their roles and responsibilities in the IR process, but also the roles and responsibilities of each IR stakeholder. This is necessary to (1) avoid duplication of effort; (2) minimize procedural gaps that may occur; and (3) ensure rapid response to computer security incidents.

NYS IR stakeholders include:

- **State Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)** – The State CISO, or the CISO’s designee, provides for overall coordination of IR including the escalation of an incident. The State CISO leads the Chief Information Security Office (CISO) within the Office of Information Technology Services (ITS) which provides incident response services for NY State.

- **SE Leadership** - Provides mainly IR oversight, with their Information Security Officer (ISO) or designee, being the most ‘hands-on’ in terms of IR management activities.

- **CISO Cyber Command Center** – The Cyber Command Center serves as a central group for detection, analysis, tracking, response to and reporting of cyber threats and incidents. The Cyber Command Center responds to incidents by providing hands-on technical IR and will recommend steps for SE staff to remediate and mitigate such that it reduces the likelihood of future incidents.

In addition, the Cyber Command Center facilitates collaboration and information sharing with other entities that may be experiencing the same or similar incidents, to help resolve the problem more quickly than if done separately. The Cyber
Command Center collects statewide information on the types of vulnerabilities that are being exploited and the frequency of attacks and shares preventative information to help other SEs protect themselves from similar attacks.

- **First Responders** - SE IT staff, such as network managers, system administrators, and other technical personnel, will be called upon, as needed, to provide support and tactical response to the Cyber Command Center. All digital forensic analysis must be performed by, or under the direction of, the Cyber Command Center.

- **Agency Incident Response Teams** – SEs must have predefined teams at the ready which include, at minimum, Executive Management, Legal and the Public Information Officer. In some cases, Human Resources and Labor Relations may become involved.

- **External Entities** - In consultation with the Cyber Command Center, external entities may conduct hands-on IR activities, such as investigative response activities, or may provide guidance. For example, a security solutions vendor may provide assistance on security appliance settings. External entities include vendors, service providers, or law enforcement including, but not limited to:
  - New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC)
  - Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)
  - New York State Police
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
  - Internet Service Providers
  - Security Solutions Vendors
  - Data Holder Vendors

### 4.2 IR Process Flow

This IR process flow covers how to respond to specific situations for IR stakeholders to ensure an effective and efficient response. The focus of the NYS IR process is to eradicate the problem as quickly as possible, while gathering actionable intelligence, to restore business functions, improve detection, and prevent reoccurrence. NYS has adopted a six step IR process flow as depicted below:

![IR Process Flow Diagram]

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1Based on the SANS Institute Incident Handling Step-by-Step
Step 1: Preparation

Proper planning and preparation for an incident before it occurs ensures a more effective and efficient IR process. Activities associated with this step, include establishing IR teams; updating IR tools, policies/procedures, and forms/checklists; and ensuring IR communication procedures and IR stakeholder contact lists are accurate and up to date. SEs must have a defined and up to date Contact List and establish multiple communication channels with all entities and individuals on the IR Contact List.

SE's must assign responsibility for a central point of contact to coordinate identification and reporting up to the CISO (typically, the SE's designated security representative performs this). As per NYS Information Security Policy, all employees must report suspected information security incidents or weaknesses to the appropriate manager and designated security representative.

The Cyber Command Center will establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) for IR to reflect industry standards and best practice. These SOPs will be followed during incident response. Any exception must be documented. The Cyber Command Center must routinely vet and validate the tools and techniques used for IR. To operate efficiently and effectively, the IR process must be tested regularly and at least annually. This testing can be carried out with mock incident training or tabletop exercises using realistic scenarios to provide a high-level outline and systematic walkthrough of the IR process, and to the extent possible, must include all IR stakeholders. These training scenarios must include specific 'discussion points' that represent key learning opportunities and incorporate lessons-learned, which can then be integrated into the IR process as part of its review.

Step 2: Identification

Identification involves review of anomalies to decide whether an incident has occurred, and if one has occurred, finding the nature of the incident. Identification begins with an event when there is an anomaly reported or noticed in a system or network. Detection can be accomplished through technical sources (e.g., operations staff, anti-virus software), non-technical sources (e.g., user security awareness and reporting), or both.

It is important to recognize that not every network or system event will be a security incident. A first responder must be assigned to determine if there is an incident, to categorize the incident, and to escalate as necessary. Typically, this will be the SE designated security representative.

To be effective in IR, incidents must be classified and escalated as soon as possible to the proper IR stakeholders to promote collaboration and information sharing. Incident classification requires the use of established incident categories, together with an incident severity matrix, as a means for prioritizing incidents and for determining proper IR activities.
Incident Categories

It is important to categorize common incidents experienced throughout the enterprise. By doing so, IR stakeholders can better focus their IR activities. It should be noted that incidents can have more than one category, and categorization may change as the investigation unfolds. NYS has adopted the seven (7) US-CERT\textsuperscript{2} incident categories as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Exercise / Network Defense Testing</td>
<td>Used during state, federal, international exercises and approved activity testing of internal/external network defenses or responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unauthorized Access</td>
<td>An individual gains logical or physical access without permission to a NYS or local government network, system, application, data, or other resource.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Denial of Service</td>
<td>An attack that successfully prevents or impairs the normal authorized functionality of networks, systems, or applications by exhausting resources. This activity includes being the victim of or participating in the Denial of Service (DoS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Malicious Code</td>
<td>Successful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based malicious entity) that infects an operating system or application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Improper Usage</td>
<td>A person who knowingly or unknowingly violates acceptable computing use policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Scans / Probes / Attempted Access</td>
<td>Includes any activity that seeks to access or identify a NYS or local government computer, open ports, protocols, service, or any combination for later exploit. This activity does not directly result in a compromise or denial of service. Unauthorized internal scans are considered incidents. Most external scans are considered to be routine, and on a case-by-case basis may require response and investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Unconfirmed incidents that are potentially malicious or anomalous activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant further review.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{2} \url{http://www.us-cert.gov/government-users/reporting-requirements}
Table 4.2 – Incident Categories

Incident Severity Matrix

All information security incidents should be categorized according to severity level to assist in determining the extent to which a formal IR is required. Severity levels are based on the perceived business impact of the incident. Severity levels may change as the investigation unfolds. General definitions and description of each severity level are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Incidents that have a severe impact on operations</td>
<td>Compromise of sensitive data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Widespread malcode attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unauthorized access to critical systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DoS affecting the entire enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Incidents that have a significant impact, or the potential to have a severe impact, on operations</td>
<td>Small-scale DoS attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Website compromises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unauthorized access (brute force attacks against FTP, ssh, and other protocols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Incidents that have a minimal impact with the potential for significant or severe impact on operations</td>
<td>Network probes or system scans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Isolated virus infections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptable use violations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 – Incident Severity Matrix

Escalation Procedures

During an incident, clear and effective communication is critical. As such, an escalation procedure should address all lines of communication in the event an incident occurs. This includes not only internal communication but external communications as well. Communication should flow through all involved IR stakeholders so that everyone has the necessary information to promptly act and carry out their responsibilities. Notification must be made as soon as possible but should not delay an SE from taking appropriate actions to isolate and contain damage.

Each SE must have an IR escalation procedure that consists of (1) an escalation matrix, (2) an up-to-date contact list with alternate contacts, and (3) multiple communications channels, all to ensure appropriate and accurate information is disseminated quickly to the appropriate IR stakeholders.
Incident Scoping

Initial scoping is provided by the SE and includes:

- Identifying potential targets (e.g., known compromised systems, likely affected systems, key systems)
- Defining external touch points (e.g., Internet, wireless, 3rd party, remote access connections)
- Prioritizing likely scenarios (e.g., internal vs., external threat, targeted attack vs., target of opportunity)
- Visualizing in-scope environment (e.g., network diagram, data flow)

Considerations for incident scoping activities are as follows:

- Relying on relevant and verified evidence sources
- Reducing false positives and volume of data
- Avoiding excessive scope and ‘scope creep’
- Realizing operational and resource limitations may affect scope

As additional incident-related information develops during the IR process and as additional stakeholders become involved, an incident typically requires re-scoping.

Incident Tracking & Reporting

A secure centralized tracking system, that can accommodate ‘need to know’ access, leads to a more efficient and systematic IR effort, as well as provides an audit trail should the efforts lead to legal prosecution of the threat.

At a minimum, documentation of the incident must contain the following information:

- Date / time the incident was reported
- Type of Incident
- Reporting source of incident
- Summary of the incident
- Current status of the incident
- All actions taken concerning the incident
- Contact information for all involved parties
- Evidence gathered during incident investigation
- Relevant comments from IR team members
- Proposed next steps to be taken
Step 3: Containment

This step focuses on containing the threat to minimize damage. It is during this step that information is collected to determine how the attack took place. All affected systems within the enterprise should be identified so that containment (and eradication and recovery) is effective and complete.

Incident containment involves ‘stopping the bleeding’ and preventing the incident from spreading. Containment can be accomplished by isolating infected systems, blocking suspicious network activity, and disabling services among other actions. Containment varies for each incident depending on the severity and risk of continuing operations. SE leadership makes decisions regarding containment measures based on recommendations from the CISO.

Step 4: Eradication

Eradication involves removing elements of the threat from the enterprise network. Specific eradication measures depend on the type of incident, number of systems involved, and the types of operating systems and applications involved. Typical eradication measures include reimaging infected systems and enhanced monitoring of system activity.

Analysis of information collected is an iterative process and occurs/reoccurs during both the containment and eradication phases.

Step 5: Recovery

Once the root cause of an incident has been eradicated, the recovery phase can begin. The goals of this step are to: (1) remediate any vulnerabilities contributing to the incident (and thus prevent future incidents) and (2) recover by restoring operations to normal. A phased approach is often used to return systems to normal operation, harden them to prevent similar future incidents and heighten monitoring for an appropriate period of time. Typical recovery activities include rebuilding systems from trusted images/gold standards, restoring systems from clean backups and replacing compromised files with clean versions.

Care must be taken to ensure that files restored from backup do not reintroduce malicious code or vulnerabilities from the incident and that the system is clean and secure before returning to production use. Once recovery has been completed, the IR lead must validate/certify that the incident has been resolved.

Step 6: Lessons Learned

An IR process is only as good as the ability to execute it successfully. Lessons learned can be the results of actual IR activities or IR capability testing, and these results should be used to improve the IR process by identifying systemic weaknesses and deficiencies and taking steps to improve on these. It is important that this take place relatively soon after the incident is closed.
Lessons learned, or postmortem, discussions provide (1) a record of steps taken to respond to an attack, (2) investigative results into determining the root cause of the attack, (3) potential improvements to make, such as IR stakeholder training and certifications, process and procedural updates, and technical modifications. Knowledge gained can be used to prevent and/or mitigate future incidents in the form of proactive services. This may include testing the IR process, conducting vulnerability assessments, providing computer security training, reviewing security policies and procedures, and disseminating cyber security reminders.

Both incident reports and the results of these lesson-learned discussions will be placed into a database for future use and shared with all IR stakeholders for situational awareness and professional development.

4.3 Incident Response Metrics

IR metrics must be compiled for each incident and reported to the CISO for enterprise situational awareness when possible and practical.

These metrics allow IR stakeholders (1) to measure IR effectiveness (and reveal potential gaps) over time; (2) identify trends in terms of threat activities and in doing so; and (3) to provide justification for additional resources, to include additional personnel, training, and tools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td># Total Incidents / Year</td>
<td>Total amount of incidents responded to per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Incidents by Type / Year</td>
<td>Total number of incidents by category responded to per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td># Personnel Hours / Incident</td>
<td>Total amount of labor spent resolving incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Days / Incident</td>
<td>Total amount of days spent resolving incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># System Down-Time Hours / Incident</td>
<td>Total hours of system down-time until incident resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Estimated Monetary Cost / Incident</td>
<td>Total estimated monetary cost per incident, to include containment, eradication, and recovery, as well as collection &amp; analysis activities (this may include labor costs, external entity assistance, tool procurements, travel, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IR Metrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Damage</td>
<td># Systems Affected / Incident</td>
<td>Total number of systems affected per incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Records Compromised / Incident</td>
<td>Total number of records compromised per incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forensics</td>
<td># Total Forensics Leveraged Incidents / Year</td>
<td>Total number of incidents requiring forensics (collection &amp; analysis) per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># System Images Analyzed / Incident</td>
<td>Total number of system images analyzed per incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># System Memory Dumps Examined / Incident</td>
<td>Total number of system physical memory dumps examined per incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.4 – Incident Response Metrics*

### 5.0 Compliance

This standard shall take effect upon publication. Compliance is expected with all enterprise policies and standards. ITS may amend its policies and standards at any time; compliance with amended policies and standards is expected.

If compliance with this standard is not feasible or technically possible, or if deviation from this policy is necessary to support a business function, State Entities shall request an exception through the Chief Information Security Office exception process.

### 6.0 Definitions of Key Terms

Except for terms defined in this policy, all terms shall have the meanings found in [http://www.its.ny.gov/glossary](http://www.its.ny.gov/glossary).

### 7.0 Contact Information

Submit all inquiries and requests for future enhancements to the policy owner at:

**Chief Information Security Office**
Reference: NYS-S13-005
NYS Office of Information Technology Services
1220 Washington Avenue, Building 5
Albany, NY 12242
Telephone: (518) 242-5200
Email: EISO@its.ny.gov
Statewide technology policies, standards, and guidelines may be found at the following website: http://www.its.ny.gov/tables/technologypolicyindex

8.0 Revision History

This policy document should be reviewed consistent with the requirements set forth in NYS-P09-003 Process for Establishing Information Technology Policies, Standards, and Guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of Change</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/15/2013</td>
<td>Original Standard Release; replaces Office of Cyber Security Policy P03-001, Cyber Incident Reporting</td>
<td>Thomas Smith, Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/21/2014</td>
<td>Standard Review – no changes</td>
<td>Deborah A. Snyder, Acting Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/20/2015</td>
<td>Clarified stakeholder roles/responsibilities, minor process changes</td>
<td>Deborah A. Snyder, Acting Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/04/2016</td>
<td>Changed Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) to Cyber Command Center</td>
<td>Deborah A. Snyder, Acting Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/10/2017</td>
<td>Update to Scope, contact information and rebranding</td>
<td>Deborah A. Snyder, Deputy Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/10/2018</td>
<td>Scheduled review – minor change to Authority, Scope, and title of office</td>
<td>Deborah A. Snyder, Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/20/2021</td>
<td>Updated Scope language</td>
<td>Karen Sorady, Chief Information Security Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.0 Related Documents

NIST SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

NIST SP 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling

NIST SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response
New York State Cyber Incident Reporting Procedures