



Anatomy of a Data Breach

June 7, 2023



Presenters



Dennis O'Connell
Director of Security Solutions
Custom Computer Specialists



Andrew T. Garbarino
Of Counsel
Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C.

Cooper & Schmitt, Inc.

Cooper & Schmitt, Inc.

- Cooper & Schmitt is a privately-held motorcycle helmet manufacturer.
- The company is a medium-sized company with approximately 500 users across 5 sites, all within the United States.
- The company has approximately 300 servers and 1,100 devices and employs an IT Staff of 3 people.
- Users continue to work in a hybrid model and have not fully returned to the office.

First Contact

- At 8:30 a.m., Helpdesk receives the first calls from end-users indicating that systems – including email, financial and file shares – could not be accessed.
- Members of the IT team immediately began troubleshooting, initially believing the incident to be an internet connectivity issue and opened case with **ISP**.
- 6 hours later, it was determined that it was not an internet-related issue and was advised to examine the Company's servers
- For the next several hours, systems continued to go offline and, at 11:00 p.m., it was determined that there was an issue with the servers

Thursday
(DAY 1)

Ransom Note Discovered

- On Friday morning, a ransomware note is discovered on the desktops of employees.
- The note demands 72 bitcoins (approximately, \$2,000,000) for the return of the data.
- Additionally, the note threatens release of the data onto the dark web if the ransom is not paid.
- Executive Management is notified of a potential cyber issue.
- Management contacts legal counsel and cybersecurity insurance company.

Friday
(DAY 2)

Data Incident Declared

- An Internal Incident Response Team is dispatched immediately to assess the environment.
- A cybersecurity consultant advises client to disconnect Internet connections, all networked devices and any connections to remote sites.
- The team develops a Communication Plan and begins maintenance of a timeline relating to the incident for use by counsel.
- The process for documenting findings and activities is reviewed and approved by management and counsel.

Friday
(DAY 2)

Detection and Analysis

- Initial assessment of damage: All servers have been encrypted, including 3 backups (on-premise, DR site and cloud-based).
- No useable copies of system configurations exist.
- Preliminary forensics are initiated at direction of counsel.
- All connectivity to the site is terminated.

Friday
(DAY 2)

Third Party Assistance

- Interview protocols are outlined and a list of necessary employee interviews is developed.
- A forensic firm begins in-depth analysis in conjunction with Incident Response Team.
- New networks are created in order to conduct forensic analysis (including “**clean**”, “**dirty**”, “**quarantined**” and “**sandbox**”).
- Endpoint detection software is installed on all systems.
- Forensic analysts begin searching for **Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)**:
 - Copies of systems are captured for review;
 - Work is done to trace Threat Actor’s steps and activity;
 - Review of log files on systems and firewalls.

Saturday
(DAY 3)

Containment

- Cooper and Schmitt engages threat actor by requesting samples of data to confirm validity; the data is real; the ransom is \$2m
- Emergency internet connection brought online for investigation and restoration.
- Rumors start to spread throughout the organization and information is leaked to the press that there was a cyber attack and data breach.

Sunday
(DAY 4)

Eradication

- Forensic evaluation determines the **Threat Actor** (“TA”) is a known organization called “Black Cat/Alph V”.
- The TA gained access through a phishing email 6 months prior, and dropped a **payload** called “Build.exe” onto the network that sat dormant for 5 months.
- The TA **brute-forced** its way into an account with administrator privileges.
- The TA accessed the Company’s active directory and ran “ADBuild.exe”, pulling all account information, credentials, directory structure, etc.
- The TA connected to virtual environment, began encrypting all servers and deleted backups local to the data center and cloud and encrypted the backup in DR location.
- The TA connected to financial server, installed “Getmefile.exe” and exfiltrated all payroll, purchasing, accounts payable, receivables and personnel information.

Sunday through Wednesday
(DAYS 4-7)

Recovery

- Production data on current backup servers is deemed unrecoverable.
- Decision is made by Executive Management to not pay ransom.
- Company tells all consultants to focus on rebuild/restoration.

DAYS (5-30)

Now What?

What Made This Organization Vulnerable?

- Lack of employee training;
- Systems that could not be patched;
 - other patching not up to date;
- Firewall was not running IPS/IDS or had geo-blocking configured;
- Did not utilize multi-factor authentication;
- Ran standard anti-virus but not EDR solution;
- Did not have an air-gapped backup solution;
- Did not implement an Incident Response Plan.

Questions and Answers
